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A Social Network Analysis of Mexico’s Dark Network Alliance
Structure
Abstract
This article assesses Mexico’s organized crime alliance and subgroup network structures.
Through social network analysis (SNA) of data from Lantia Consultores, a consulting firm
in Mexico that specializes in the analysis of public policies, it demonstrates differential
alliance structures within Mexico’s bipolar illicit network system. The Cártel de Jalisco
Nueva Generación’s (CJNG) alliance structure is top-down and hierarchical, while the
Sinaloa Cartel is denser, particularly in the broader Tierra Caliente region. Additionally, our
analysis found a sparse overall network with many isolates (groups with no relations to
other groups) and disconnected components. Further, we identified organized crime
networks that might fill future power vacuums based on their network positions, following
state or rival high-value targeting of major cartels. The implications of these findings are
discussed, and policy recommendations are provided.
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Introduction
In assessing Mexico’s illicit network alliance structures, the authors
demonstrate, as consulting firm Lantia Consultores has described and
previous scholars have assessed, that Mexico is once again in a bipolar
cartel structure in terms of the illicit networks operating in Mexico.1
Whereas that bipolarity was once split between the Sinaloa Cartel and Los
Zetas (2000s), today the primary poles of power are between the Sinaloa
Cartel and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG).2 While that
much is well-known, the visualization of the Lantia Consultores’ organized
crime network data provide key new insights.3
The visualizations bring out in stark relief the nature of the alliance and
subgroup structures within groups allied to the Sinaloa Cartel and the
CJNG. The CJNG has a hierarchical, centralized, internal alliance
structure with almost none of its affiliates allying with each other. Nearly
all connections route directly through the CJNG. The Sinaloa Cartel
alliance structure is fundamentally different, particularly in the Tierra
Caliente conflict zone, where its allies and subgroups have denser
connections to other Sinaloa Cartel allies and subgroups. Ego network
analysis (networks of connections based on those with ties to a single
node) forms visual representations that help convey findings in an
intuitive fashion.4
These varying alliance structures have important implications for many
policy-related questions, such as what will happen if the leadership of the
CJNG collapses via death or arrest, what will happen if fragmentation of
the Sinaloa Cartel increases due to deepening conflict between Mayo
Zambada and Chapo Guzman’s sons (Los Chapitos), and what groups are
well-positioned in terms of existing alliances to supplant the other two if
conditions are ripe? Possible answers to these questions are achieved
through a series of ego-nets and other social network analyses, combined
with qualitative background research.
This article unfolds into four sections:
1. A literature review on illicit network alliance structures and
social network analysis;
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2. A discussion of the social network analysis methods employed
and the Lantia Consultores data utilized;
3. A presentation of the data analysis with visualizations; and
4. A conclusion with policy recommendations, an overview of the
limitations of the study, and a discussion of avenues for further
research.

Literature Review
Similar to states in the international system, criminal groups often form
alliances with other criminal networks, with few criminal entities
remaining unaligned throughout their lifetimes. According to Irina A.
Chindea, a criminal group’s alignment with other criminal entities can
take place under various circumstances, with the presence of threats
external to the organization or changes in relative distribution of power in
the underworld representing some of the main drivers behind illicit
network alliance behavior.5 When a criminal group faces threats from
another criminal organization, it can decide to either engage in
bandwagoning behavior by aligning itself with the source of the danger, or
it can balance against the respective threat by forming alliances with other
groups or illicit networks.6 Akin to the alliance behavior that takes place in
the international system, in the underworld balancing behavior is usually
more prevalent than bandwagoning.7 For instance, in 2010, when Los
Zetas was on the rise and carrying out gruesome acts of violence in Mexico
against both rival organizations and innocent civilians, the Gulf Cartel
temporarily allied with the Sinaloa Cartel as a way to balance against the
threat Los Zetas posed.8
Furthermore, government crackdown on illicit networks usually results in
shifts in the relative distribution of power in the underworld, ultimately
leading to a reconfiguration of existing alliances among criminal groups.
Because arrests and targeted killings weaken criminal entities,
hierarchically organized criminal groups tend to fractionalize when key
leaders succumb to government decapitation operations. The resulting
entities, often referred to as cartelitos or small cartels, are more likely to
become targets of powerful illicit organizations, unless they enter
balancing or bandwagoning alliances with other criminal groups on the
ground.9
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The Sinaloa Federation itself was born in the context of the Mexican
government’s successful decapitation strategy that in 1989 resulted in the
arrest of Félix Gallardo and the dismemberment of the so-called
Guadalajara Cartel. Some of the smaller resulting entities aligned
themselves into what became known as the Sinaloa Federation to oppose
the rising and extremely violent Arellano Felix Organization.10 Throughout
its over 30 years of history, the Sinaloa Cartel relied on balancing behavior
as a mechanism to survive, rise to power, maintain power, and continue to
survive in the face of rising splinter illicit networks such as the CJNG. The
aggressive crackdown and decapitation strategies that the Calderón
administration undertook against major criminal organizations operating
in Mexico from 2006 to 2012, resulted in a fragmented underworld and
rapid shifts in alliances on the ground as established organizations like the
Sinaloa Cartel were weakened, and new ones, like the CJNG, came into
being.11 The authors hypothesize that some of the alliance behavior
associated with the Sinaloa Cartel in recent years has been rooted in
Sinaloa’s modus operandi since its inception as a networked criminal
entity, while simultaneously being representative of the changing power
dynamics on the ground. The analysis presented in this article
demonstrates the presence of extensive balancing behavior occurring in
illicit networks, as earlier work by Irina A. Chindea posited.
Illicit networks and non-traditional alliances
Scholars such as John P. Sullivan have pointed to complex networked
alliances among illicit networks in Mexico.12 For example, nontraditional
alliances are seen between transnational drug trafficking organizations
(criminal cartels) and transnational gangs. One notorious case is the
alliance or links between Los Zetas and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). This
alliance relationship is characterized inaccurately as a merger. That
portrayal is an exaggeration, but minimizing those links is also inaccurate.
Los Zetas, a now largely defunct organization, began as an enforcer
network for the Gulf Cartel. Members of Los Zetas were essentially
mercenaries that were once trained and in some cases part of the Grupos
Aeromoviles de Fuerzas Especiales, or Mexican Special Forces. Los Zetas,
a hierarchical organization with centralized leadership, brought military
skill sets to bear in the lucrative drug trade and eventually broke away
from the Gulf Cartel to operate as an independent enterprise. At the height
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of their strength, they operated from the U.S.-Mexico border along the Rio
Grande in Texas to Central America. Los Zetas were known for their
infantry tactics and barbarization. Their operational approach mobilized
terror and intimidation to control their criminal portfolio, which ranged
from narcotrafficking to selling counterfeit goods and huachicoleo
meaning petroleum theft.
Mara Salvatrucha, on the other hand, was and remains a decentralized,
networked gang. The MS-13 network ranges from Los Angeles, the city
where it was formed to New York, Washington, D.C., and Central America,
including El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. MS-13 has a distributed,
networked organization defined by individual clicas or cliques. These
cliques share a common identity and ethos and interact through “networks
of influence.”13 Respect and loyalty are the currency of influence within
MS-13. A hierarchy of respect expresses itself through social relationships
within and across individual cliques in the network. Leadership distributes
itself within cliques with a primera palabra or first word and segunda
palabra or second word, setting priorities for the clique with the segunda
palabra from large powerful clicas often exerting influence over smaller,
subordinate cliques. This relationship drives itself by using fealty in a neofeudal arrangement. The leadership collects taxes or tribute from the
subordinate cliques and in turn offers protection. Each individual clique
retains a high degree of autonomy, and localized leadership arrangements
have evolved in various geographic regions. This is especially true on the
U.S. East Coast.14 Localized leadership arrangements have also evolved in
El Salvador where the cliques have evolved into super-cells or programs.15
Fealty is enforced through influence and violence as expressed in the
gang’s informal motto mata, controla, viola meaning to kill, control, or
rape. Mara Salvatrucha’ s modular structure allows it to adapt to local
circumstances and criminal markets. In Los Angeles it traditionally has
ties to La Eme or the Mexican mafia.16 Outside Los Angeles it is free to
forge local alliances or act as contractors for other criminal enterprises or
cartels.
The MS-13-Los Zetas alliance was not a formalized treaty-based endeavor;
rather it was a loose cooperative agreement arranged at local clique levels.
Local alliances are tolerated if they do not compete with the overall
network capacity to operate. Of course, Los Zetas are now largely out of
business and have morphed into new enterprises, including the Grupo
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Bravo and Zetas Vieja Escuela, aligned with the Gulf Cartel against
another Zeta faction, the Cártel del Noreste (CDN). Corruption and
violence persist, and the various factions maintain a variable degree of
interaction (and interpenetration) with corrupt government officials.17
These arrangements vary in time and space.
Another networked organization is La Línea, an enforcer gang found in
the Juárez plaza (Ciudad Juárez and environs adjacent to El Paso. La
Línea functioned as a mercenary, protective entity for the Juárez Cartel or
Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization. It was comprised of sicarios, or
drug dealers, and corrupt police officials highlighting the importance of
corruption and collusion. It was (and remains) a hybrid linked to Barrio
Azteca (a prison-street gang complex in El Paso) and Los Aztecas, their
affiliate in Ciudad Juárez (see Figure 1).18 La Línea is an example of a
variant third-generation street gang providing specialized services and
para-political influence for its cartel partners.19 Like Los Zetas of a
previous decade, which became independent, La Línea now works with the
CJNG and partners with Barrio Azteca’s rebranded Los Nuevos Aztecas.

80
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 4

Figure 1. La Línea Ego Network

Source: Lantia Consultores
Notes: Used with permission

Illicit networks come in many shapes and sizes. They include mixes of
criminal enterprises in shifting alliances for profit and power. They also
often include sub-groups or cliques that are part of the larger umbrella
organization, and they form alliances to further their goals on the streets,
in prisons, and across borders. These illicit networks contain real criminal
and political power and can influence state actions including their
solvency and sovereignty.20 The relationships are akin to joint ventures
and alliances. These range from serving as foot soldiers—in other words
enforcers and distributors for street-level drug sales to brokers of political
and criminal influence. Social network analysis (SNA) is one effective way
to determine the nature and strength of the various network connections.
Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis is a perspective that uses several approaches to
produce a broad strategy for investigating complex social structures.21 As
Renée van der Hulst explains, “in addition to visualizations of network
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graphs, SNA is an arithmetical technique that analyzes relational patterns
of nodes (actors) and connections (ties) based on mathematical
computations.”22 It can map organized criminal networks as it focuses on
ever-evolving interactions and relationships among individuals or groups
and empirically determine social structures.23 Further, SNA can help
identify and analyze the major structural, communicational, and
interactional features of a criminal group, allowing researchers to evaluate
the most effective methods for disrupting such groups.24 Scholars have
used SNA to study a wide range of criminal groups, from terrorist cells
involved in the 2002 Bali bombings to criminal groups engaged in an
extensive series of convenience store robberies in Richmond, Virginia.25
The use of SNA by law enforcement is growing around the world. For
example, the Australian state law enforcement agency has used SNA to
support its investigations, and analysts were able to identify individuals
that detectives had not been aware of or had paid little attention to.26 SNA
was also indispensable in unravelling a cannabis cultivation network in the
Netherlands known as Blackbird by allowing Dutch police to identify
intelligence gaps and potential informants.27 Criminal network analysis is
most useful when used with a mixed methodology to place the quantitative
results in the necessary context. For example, in the Blackbird case,
quantitative data was able to identify women as central actors, even
though detectives had paid them minimal attention before the use of SNA.
Detectives also applied a qualitative methodology to understand why
women occupied those central positions, providing a deeper
understanding of the mechanisms associated with this criminal network.28
Valuable applications of mixed-methods SNA have been recently used to
analyze drug trafficking organizations.29 Researchers used a specific
example of this type of analysis to uncover the unintended consequences
of the kingpin strategy on the “Fernando Sanchez Organization” (Arellano
Felix Organization or Tijuana Cartel).30 Economist Melissa Dell also used
SNA-mixed methods to examine the direct and spillover effects of the
Mexican government’s policy to combat drug trafficking organizations.
Dell was able to identify how newly elected mayors associated with Partido
Acción Nacional (a conservative political party in Mexico) caused more
violence when they attempted to crack down on incumbent criminals.31
Dell observed that violence increased as the crackdowns diverted existing
drug routes into other municipalities and created opportunities for rival
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gangs.32Scholars such as Dudley and Taylor have also qualitatively
assessed cartel networks in Mexico and found that the CJNG drug
networks prefer to prevent their contractors from working with
others.33The findings, which quantitively assess the hierarchy levels of the
ego networks of major cartels in Mexico, are consistent with this view of
the CJNG. Scholars have even applied social network analysis to Mexican
organized crime’s social media presence.34

Methodology and Data
Lantia Consultores provided the data set for this analysis in two files in the
spring of 2021. The first data set included organized crime alliances in
Mexico, and the second file contained subgroups. These data sets are
combined for a more accurate and comprehensive picture of Mexican
organized crime relationships.
A node, also known as an actor (visually depicted as a square), is in this
case an organized crime group or subgroup in Mexico. A tie or edge is a
relationship between them, an alliance or subgroup relationship, and is
illustrated with a line. The lines sometimes have arrows to denote the
direction of the relationship. For example, a large group would have a line
with an arrow pointing from it to a subordinate group, but the arrow may
not point back toward the larger group. As Sean F. Everton points out, it
can be difficult to assess a large network. ego network analysis focuses on a
single node and its ties to other nodes. Whatever the analyst chooses to
focus on is the ego, which is the single focal node. The authors discuss the
two largest cartels in Mexico the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG and their
ego networks. The ego altered, which are other nodes with ties to the ego.
An ego network thus contains the ego, alters, and the ties between them.
All analysis is based on the combined alliance and subgroup data set. The
alliance data was undirected. On the other hand, the subgroup data
revealed that larger groups held power over smaller groups and is directed.
The alliance data is converted to directed data in edge list format. To
combine these networks, the authors converted the data sets into edge lists
and imported the network into the SNA program UCINET, which
converted the edge lists into an adjacency matrix.35
The visualizations are created in Netdraw a subprogram of UCINET with a
focus on ego networks related to the bipolar cartel structure. Ego network
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analysis allows researchers to rapidly make sense of large data sets by
focusing on the ties or edges of individual focal actors.36 Social network
exploratory analysis is more accurate when significant background
knowledge of the network in mind.37

Visualizations and Analysis
The overall network of dark network alliances and subgroups in Mexico is
relatively sparse with a concentration around two main poles of power, the
Sinaloa Cartel, and the CJNG. Exploratory analysis reveals pockets of
network density in specific regions, for example, the conflict zones of the
Tierra Caliente and Guanajuato. Figure 2 is a visualization of the entire
alliance and subgroup organized crime network in Mexico with isolates
(unconnected actors) removed.
Figure 2. Entire alliance and subgroup organized crime network in Mexico

Source: Lantia Consultores
Notes: Used with permission

The layout is circular with roughly 390 groups (nodes) depicted in the
Lantia Consultores data sans the isolates or nodes with no ties. The
authors size the nodes or groups on betweenness centrality with the
highest degree nodes brought to the center. Betweenness centrality is a
common centrality metric and is also a brokerage metric.38 Nodes with
84
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high betweenness centrality lie on “the shortest paths between all pairs of
actors” and represent nodes in key brokerage positions within the network
based on this position.39 Thus, the nodes with the highest betweenness
centrality are the Sinaloa Cartel and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva
Generación.
Other nodes such as Esquema Gan, Clan Zheng, Cártel del Poniente, and
Los Erres are located between the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG, giving
them higher betweenness centrality. This means the two rival cartels share
four allied groups in common. This is depicted in more depth later. Table 1
provides network topography measures for the whole alliance and
subgroup network.
Table 1. Whole Network Topography Measures.40
Combined Network Topography
Avg Degree
Deg Centralization
Density
Components
Component Ratio
Connectedness
Fragmentation
Avg Distance
SD Distance
Diameter

Metrics
0.87948716
0.09850131
0.00226089
290
0.74293059
0.08584141
0.91415858
4.27942848
1.65597022
10

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data.
Notes: Used with permission

We see a sparse network in terms of density (a ratio of number of ties to
possible ties) of .0002. We also see a low average degree (the average
number of ties an actor has) of .879, or less than one tie each. This is,
however, deceptive as a small number of cartels are hubs and have many
ties such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG.41 Nonetheless, the network’s
diameter is 10, which means the shortest path between the two most
distant nodes is across 10 other actors. Further, the network has many
isolates organized criminal groups with no connection to any other groups.
The analysis shifts to the two largest hubs with an analysis of their ego
networks in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel Ego Networks

Source: Lantia Consultores
Notes: Used with permission

Figure 3 strips away actors unconnected to the CJNG and the Sinaloa
Cartel to give a first glimpse into the alliance structures of the two most
central actors. Figure 3 is the combined ego-networks of the Sinaloa Cartel
and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación. The authors size the nodes on
eigenvector centrality (which considers the actor’s ties to other important
actors). Focusing on the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel exclusively, allows
the authors to visually observe important structural features of the
network. First, the Sinaloa Cartel network alliance pole has significantly
more interconnectivity than the CJNG alliance pole, a key finding of this
article. Second, there are four nodes that connect to both the Sinaloa
Cartel and the CJNG. Clan Zheng specifically is a money laundering and
fentanyl trafficking group, which suggests there may be capacity for money
laundering groups to work with both poles of power. Notice the ties
between alters (nodes connected to the ego or focal node) within the
Sinaloa alliance. This contrasts with the CJNG alliance structure. Figures 4
86
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and 5 will clarify this further. Figure 4 shows the Sinaloa Cartel ego
network with nodes sized on degree centrality (a count of the number of
ties an actor has).
Figure 4. Sinaloa Cartel Ego Network

Source: Lantia Consultores
Notes: Used with permission

Here can observe significant interconnectivity between the groups the
Sinaloa Cartel allies with. In short, the Sinaloa Cartel alliance is more
likely to have sub-alliances. There are more than 17 symmetric ties
between groups in the Sinaloa Cartel ego network excluding alter ties to
Sinaloa. These groups concentrate primarily in the Tierra Caliente region
and include groups known to be fighting in the state of Michoacán,
including but not limited to the Cárteles Unidos, La Nueva Familia
Michoacana, and Los Viagras. This alliance density may be balancing
against the Cártel De Jalisco Nueva Generación’s powerful push into the
state of Michoacán.42
There are two possibilities for how the Sinaloa Cartel counter invasion
strategy could be operating. The first possibility is Sinaloa may be weak
and thus may need to use existing groups to balance against the more
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powerful CJNG. This may be due to internal fragmentation following the
arrest of Chapo Guzman and the related questions of succession.
A second possibility is the Sinaloa Cartel has a longer history of working
within existing alliance structures. Thus, the Sinaloa Cartel is less
interested in controlling or annexing the groups it works with but is
operating transactionally through them for specific gains.43 The CJNG egonetwork (see Figure 5) reveals significant features of the CJNG alliance
structure.
Figure 5. Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Ego Network

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data
Notes: Used with permission

It has only one subgroup edge between the Guerreros Unidos and Los
Colombianos. Except for that tie, no other ties between subgroups appear
in the CJNG ego network. That suggests a hierarchical model wherein the
CJNG has significant control of all subgroups.
As previous research has shown, the CJNG is adept at adopting orphan
cells from fragmented cartels, and using its profits from Los Cuinis
financial operators (Los Cuinis is an allied group with the CJNG with close
family ties) and control of ports such as Manzanillo and Lázaro Cárdenas
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to profit from the importation of precursor chemicals used for fentanyl
and methamphetamine.44 The CJNG has been described by scholars,
including Dutch photojournalist and anthropologist Teun Voeten, as
following a franchise based model, which allows them to take a top-down
approach with weaker, less-experienced criminal actors. 45
As Michael Kenney points out in his discussion of wheel networks, these
networks are a significant source of vulnerability to kingpin strikes, as
seen in the Medellín Cartel decapitation in 1993.46 This article is a “meso”
analysis of groups in their alliance structure, and it is beyond the scope of
this article to address the internal operational structures of the CJNG. 47
These structures have no doubt been dynamic and compartmentalized to
protect key figures from kingpin strikes by the U.S. and Mexican
governments or even rival cartels.
While the hierarchical control by the CJNG creates vulnerability for the
overall function of the network, it holds significant advantage for the
network in terms of control. For example, the Sinaloa Cartel has learned
painful lessons about allowing too much centralization within their
network. In the bloody split between the Beltran Leyva Organization
(BLO) and the Sinaloa Cartel in the 2007-2008 period, this was an
acknowledged lesson.48 The debriefing of a former Sinaloa Cartel affiliate
leader known as El Tomate in the 2010s revealed that after the BLO split,
the Sinaloa Cartel compartmentalized cells operating under its umbrella in
Tijuana and kept them in competition with each other lest they turn on
their former masters. 49
Table 2. Ego Network Krackhardt GTD Hierarchy Scores
Egonets

Hierarchy

CJNG

0.62963

Carteles Unidos

0.556291

Sinaloa Cartel

0.46993

CSRL

0.153846

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data
Notes: Used with permission

The CJNG strategy prevents internal conflict by minimizing the suballiances the groups have within its ego network making it more
hierarchical. Hierarchy is “the extent to which paths are not reciprocated”
in the network.50 The hierarchical structure of the CJNG egonet is
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demonstrated by its Krackhardt hierarchy score of .629 as compared to
.469 for the Sinaloa Cartel, depicted in Table 2. This score is on a 0-1 scale
and thus can interpret the CJNG ego network as roughly 34percent more
hierarchical than the Sinaloa Cartel ego network. Figure 6 is an egonetwork for the Cárteles Unidos group that allies with the Sinaloa Cartel
and is considered an alliance of groups combatting the CJNG in the
Michoacán area.
Figure 6. Ego Network for Cárteles Unidos

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data
Notes: Used with permission

The Cárteles Unidos is highly central within the dense network of Sinaloa
Cartel alliances in Tierra Caliente, as it battles the CJNG. However, as
InSight Crime describes, it is “a strategic alliance in itself, counting on
cooperation between the groups that form it.”51 Led by El Abuelo, it is not
a group but an alliance of groups. However, over time this alliance of
groups, which formed to battle the CJNG and has been coherent since
2020, may morph into its own power with a dominant network position.
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Could Cárteles Unidos be a power player in the event of Sinaloa Cartel and
CJNG fragmentation? Or is it simply an umbrella group operating with the
backing of the Sinaloa Cartel? Several factors suggest that Michoacán
could become a site where new major cartels expand in the wake of
weakening and fragmentation of other groups. These include the sheer
number of groups operating in the Michoacán region; the expansion of
these groups into legal sectors like mining, logging, and the avocado
industry; and their control over the Port of Lázaro Cárdenas. If this is the
case, groups such as Cárteles Unidos and the Cártel de Santa Rosa de
Lima (CSRL) are well positioned through their networks. However, there
are countervailing trends. Uniting the groups in the Tierra Caliente region
is difficult given their histories of animosity, conflict, and the difficulty of
the terrain, which has long made governance problematic.52 Nacho
Coronel of the Sinaloa Cartel formed a Cárteles Unidos to counter Los
Zetas in 2010, but when that threat diminished, the groups fragmented
and fought.53
For better or for worse, cartel fragmentation appears unlikely to happen
under Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s administration,
despite some notable successes such as the arrest of the head of the CSRL,
El Marro.54 The López Obrador administration appears intent on avoiding
the fragmentation of major organized crime groups through high-value
targeting.55 This is likely due to a desire to avoid major bloodshed in large
scale confrontations, as happened in October 2019 in Culiacán when the
government released Ovidio Guzmán following a bloody siege in response
to his capture.56 One key recent exception was the July 2022 capture of
Caro Quintero shortly after a meeting between President Biden and
AMLO.57
More recent reports have indicated that the Mexican government is using
its new National Guard to effectively reify the battle lines between cartels
and prevent conflict. In this sense the National Guard is patrolling the
spaces between organized crime groups—not removing them.58 This
strategy suggests limited fragmentation of organized crime groups occurs
for the duration of this administration, and when it does occur, it will
likely be the result of internecine and inter-cartel conflict and less the
result of government action. This assumes current trends continue.
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Further, organized crime actors have entered legal industries, as evidenced
by the February 2022 threats against a U.S. Department of Agriculture
inspector working on compliance in the avocado industry in Michoacán.59
In response to the threats, the United States shut down all exports from
Michoacán, the only state where authorized avocado exports occur. As
Lantia Consultores points out, this is in line with previous U.S.
government responses to the targeting of U.S. law enforcement. Typically,
the United States has sought to establish a deterrent effect, which has so
far succeeded in preventing violence against U.S. law enforcement in
Mexico.60
A bright spot in the López Obrador administration policy has been a focus
on the financial resources of major trafficking groups. The Financial
Investigations Unit (UIF) has become more high profile and announced
significant investigations and targeting of ill-gotten assets during the
López Obrador administration for example, Operation Blue Agave against
the CJNG.61 These money laundering investigations rely on network
analysis to connect people to business entities and mirror the
investigations conducted by the U.S. Treasury Department and its Office of
Foreign Asset Control. It is difficult to know how effective these have been,
given the dark nature of the illicit market and its indeterminate size.
Unfortunately, the head of the UIF resigned in late 2021 due to
accusations that guests to his wedding in Guatemala carried large amounts
of cash.62 The Cártel de Santa Rosa de Lima (Figure 7) is one of the most
densely connected actors in the Mexican cartel alliance structure despite
its lack of a direct tie to the Sinaloa Cartel.
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Figure 7. Ego-Net Cártel de Santa Rosa de Lima

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data
Notes: Used with permission

This is also despite the arrest of its leader El Marro in 2020.63 The CSRL is
thus another group that may be increasingly resilient and capable of
expanding its power through alliances with other groups. Figure 8 depicts
the combined ego-nets of La Nueva Empresa and La Nueva Familia
Michoacana groups in the Tierra Caliente region. La Nueva Familia is a
subgroup of the Cárteles Unidos. La Nueva Empresa is in turn a subgroup
of La Nueva Familia, and Los Arreola and Guardia Michoacana are in
turn subgroups of La Nueva Empresa.
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Figure 8. Combined Ego-Nets of La Nueva Familia and La Nueva Empresa

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data
Notes: Used with permission

The CSRL is based out of Guanajuato, which is not in the Tierra Caliente
region. However, it clearly allies with a significant number of groups from
the Tierra Caliente region and, through these indirect ties, it has an
alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel. To address the increasing complexity of
Mexican organized crime, analysts at Stratfor have generated maps that
divide Mexico into three regions: The Gulf, the Northern Pacific (Sinaloa
groups), and the Tierra Caliente (depicted broadly, beyond the subregion
located in the states of Estado de Mexico, Guerrero, and Michoacán).64
The alliance structures see lend credence to this interpretation. Figure 9
depicts the four key brokers with shared alliances with both the CJNG and
the Sinaloa Cartel.
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Figure 9. Key Brokers with Shared Alliances with Both the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel.

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data
Notes: Used with permission

The first is Clan Zheng, a money laundering organization with connections
to China and specialized capacities such as fentanyl trafficking.65 This may
explain in part why it is permitted to work with both major cartels. It
performs a critical function for both groups that may not be easily
replaced. Thus, violence against this group by either group would hurt
both. The second group is Esquema Gan. It is another money laundering
group operating in Guadalajara according to Lantia Consultores. Like Clan
Zheng, their money laundering capacities may allow the group to remain
neutral and work and ally with both the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG. The
third group is the Cártel de Poniente. According to Lantia Consultores, it
operates in Torreón and is a subgroup of Los Guzmans, participating in
retail drug trafficking, arms/drug trafficking, and extortion. This group
may be an example of the non-traditional alliances observed and predicted
by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus.66 Los Erres is an armed group
operating in Tijuana that, according to the Lantia Consultores data
platform, traffics drugs and arms. It is interesting to note that an armed
group might have ties or alliances to both major poles within the bipolar
system. The fact that this has occurred in Tijuana is worthy of discussion.
The CJNG worked with the Sinaloa Cartel to enter the Tijuana trafficking
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corridor after weakening the Cartel Arellano Felix.67 The CJNG and
Sinaloa Cartel ruptured at some point in roughly 2013.68 Thus, it may be
that some groups chose to remain neutral or were allowed to continue
collaborating with both the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel during this
conflict. Figure 10 depicts the main component of the network with the
Girvan-Newman community detection algorithm.69
Figure 10. Network Main Component with Community Detection

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data
Notes: Used with permission

Due to the shared brokers depicted in Figure 9, the CJNG and the Sinaloa
Cartel are part of the same network component. Despite their war, they
have so many connections that, mathematically speaking in this algorithm,
they are part of the same component. Interestingly, it is the Tierra Caliente
groups and those based in Guanajuato that are detected as a second
subgroup. This detection of a second subgroup is consistent with the ego
network density depicted in Table 3.
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Table 3. Density and Average Degree Scores
Density

Total

St Dev

Average Weighted
Degree

Sinaloa Cartel Egonet
CJNG Egonet
CU Egonet
CSRL Egonet

0.059
0.042
0.158
0.167

92
59
54
26

0.249
0.204
0.403
0.406

2.3
1.53
2.842
2

Overall Network

0.002

370

0.053

0.949

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data.
Notes: Used with permission

From Table 3, can see that Tierra Caliente and Guanajuato connected ego
networks, such as the Cárteles Unidos and the Cartel de Santa Rosa de
Lima, have higher density and average degree scores than the overall
network and the CJNG/Sinaloa Cartel. Figure 11 shows disconnected
portions of the network and was achieved by removing the main
component and isolate nodes.
Figure 11. Disconnected Network Components (No isolates).

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UCINET analysis of Lantia Consultores data
Notes: Used with permission
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The Cartel del Noreste is disconnected from the main network component
only connecting to its armed subgroup/armed wing the Tropa de Infierno.
This may be specious, however. Power in the world of Mexican organized
crime is not just be about connections to other armed groups and
alliances, but profits. Any group such as the embattled CDN, which
controls the lucrative Nuevo Laredo trafficking corridor, has the capability
to project power beyond this limited plaza.70 Thus, should not ignore the
roles of profit and strategic positioning, regardless of illicit network
position.71

Conclusion
Mexico has a bipolar alliance structure that is divided between the CJNG
and the Sinaloa Cartel. The primary contribution of this article is to
demonstrate that the alliances have fundamentally different structures.
The CJNG alliance is hierarchical with almost no subgroup ties. The CJNG
thus appears to be a dominant, hierarchical, and critical node. This
structure was visually demonstrated in figures and quantitatively
presented in tables based upon the structure of the network. It strongly
suggests the CJNG seeks control of the groups within its network and
seeks a monopoly. Many of the allies and subgroups have names with
Nueva Generación, demonstrating an attempt to brand the groups as
subgroups and affiliates. It also suggests that the removal of the CJNG via
high value targeting of leadership figures could be highly disruptive to the
alliance and slow its seemingly inexorable territorial expansion.
Conversely, the Sinaloa Cartel pursues a denser alliance network strategy,
inserting itself into existing alliances or fomenting alliances among its
subgroups. There are two likely explanations for this strategy. First, the
Sinaloa Cartel alliance structure could be a sign of weakness in the face of
the CJNG national expansion, and these alliances are a sign of realist
balancing by non-state actors.72 Second, the Sinaloa Cartel alliance
structure could be a result of its modus operandi related to a transactional
business model and a history of federation and networked alliances. In this
scenario, it is simply the Sinaloa Cartel’s style to form alliances and
federations with existing trafficking and organized crime groups. Both
scenarios are equally likely, and the reality is that both may be
contributing to the structure. While the overall dark alliance structure was
sparse and fragmented, the Tierra Caliente region had the densest alliance

98
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 4

structures. The nearby state of Guanajuato, where the CJNG battles the
CSRL, was also a dense subgroup.
What comes after the CJNG or the Sinaloa Cartel? Network analysis
cannot provide concrete forecasts. However, there are two primary
hypotheses based on network theory presented here. First, groups with
significant alliances such as the CSRL, the Cárteles Unidos, La Nueva
Familia Michoacana, and Guerreros Unidos may well be positioned to use
those alliances to fill vacuums left by the removal of the Sinaloa Cartel or
the CJNG from dominant positions. Conversely, the removal of dominant
groups is not likely to be clean. Rather, fragments within those groups will
retain significant infrastructure, resources, alliance connections, and other
capacities which will allow them to fill vacuums. Thus, the second
hypothesis is that a fragment of the Sinaloa Cartel or the CJNG will play a
major role in the future of Mexican trafficking if those groups are
removed. Given the internal alliance structure of the Sinaloa Cartel pole, it
appears that in the event of the removal of the Sinaloa Cartel, its
subgroups and allies would be better positioned to form new replacement
connections and thus be more resilient than those within the CJNG
alliance structure in the event of the removal of the CJNG.
If the Mexican government returns to a high-tempo, high-value targeting
approach, are likely to see more disconnected cells and small groups that
will achieve their ends in a networked fashion. Given weak rule of law,
these groups will increasingly expand into legal markets and engage in
predatory extortion and other criminal activities that are not low in profile
or impact. They will increasingly challenge the state in criminal enclaves
and transform the state more broadly especially in the densest networked
or conflict zones.73
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
This study has numerous limitations. It is primarily exploratory in nature.
Future research could triangulate with high-level trafficker interviews to
ascertain the strategies employed by the various trafficking groups in
terms of their alliances and business models. Combining quantitative and
qualitative methods could test the hypotheses presented here to establish
causality in the empirical findings that the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG
pursue fundamentally different internal alliance structures and establish
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causal mechanisms. Future research could also assess new possible
resulting network structures in the event of the removal of the CJNG.
Policy Recommendations
Organized crime in Mexico can only be addressed through investments in
rule of law institutions, including improved local police and stronger
investigative capacity at all levels of government. Mexico needs
institutional stability rather than fundamental government overhauls of all
bureaucracies every six-year presidential term. The National Guard should
expand and improve its investigative capacity so that it can target highlevel organized crime actors and set standards for state and local law
enforcement.74 Improved tax collection is necessary to institutionalize
better law enforcement and court systems.75 Additionally, a focus on anticorruption is needed and must be accompanied by political consensus on
this matter across all political parties. Mexican intelligence should also use
network analysis to plan for the aftereffects of high value targeting by U.S.
and Mexican law enforcement.
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